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SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: MAKING THEIR TESTIMONY MORE
RELIABLE
MARILEE M. KAPSA & CARL B. MEYER*
During the past seven years the U.S. Supreme Court started to change
the rules of evidence with the goal of making expert testimony more reli-
able. This article analyzes some of the underlying problems and asks
whether the effort can succeed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of scientific expert witnesses goes back to the Roman Empire.'
The importance and power of scientific evidence in resolving legal issues is
undisputed.' However, the role and the scope of expert testimony has been
the subject of controversy3 for more than a hundred years.' The testimony of
medical experts has always been especially controversial because medicine
touches life and death, much of it remains an art, and medical decisions in-
volve subjective values.
During recent years the controversy has focused on the interface be-
. Marilee Kapsa and Carl Meyer are partners in the law firm of Kapsa & Meyer with
offices in Las Vegas and San Diego. Their practice concentrates on resolving deadlocked and
complex civil litigations by mediation, arbitration, or litigation. Marilee Kapsa holds a B.A.
in Mathematics Education and received her J.D. Magna Cum Laude from California Western
School of Law in 1988. Carl Meyer also received his J.D. in 1988 from California Western
School of Law. He holds a Ph.D. in Chemistry, is a former tenured professor of Chemistry at
the University of Washington, and has served as a scientific expert in more than eighty civil
and administrative litigations.
1. The first documented forensic expert report seems to be that of Antisius who was
asked to examine the corpse of Julius Caesar and opined that only one of 23 sword wounds
was deadly, namely the one perforating his thorax. See SUETONIUS, THE LivEs OF THE
CAESARS BOOKI 111-13 (J.C. Rolfe trans., 1960).
2. Perhaps, the most dramatic recent example is DNA typing, which offers a far greater
level of reliability in identifying individuals than, say, the traditional line-up. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE
USE OF DNA EvIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/search97cgi/s97_cgi>.
3. See generally Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Ex-
pert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901); William L. Foster, Expert Testimony, Preva-
lent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REv. 169 (1897).
4. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT BAR 24-25 (1995).
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tween clinical medicine, clinical toxicology and molecular toxicology,5 epi-
demiology, survey research, forensic DNA evidence, statistics, and multiple
regressions.6
It has been claimed that the evidence rules encourage partisan bias and
make expert testimony complex and time consuming.7 In fact, Wigmore
vigorously opposed the opinion rule, and claimed that it "has done more
than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a state of le-
galized gambling."8
Whether expert testimony is necessary is determined by the common
sense inquiry. That is to say, whether an untrained lay person would be
qualified to determine the particular issue intelligently and to the best possi-
ble degree without enlightenment from those having specialized under-
standing of the subject involved.9
The admissibility of scientific expert testimony varies from state to
state, and is determined by an ever more complex array of statutory rules
and common law decisions. California continues to apply the decision in the
venerable Frye case,"° while some other states have adopted the Daubert
rules." The federal courts currently follow a combination of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the Daubert, General Electric v. Joiner,2 and
Kumho"3 cases, but the Moore'4 case, and the proposed revision of Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence 5 reflect the fact that many federal trial
judges are uncertain about the interpretation and implementation of the re-
cent Supreme Court decisions.
Trial judges have a large degree of discretion and their decisions can
5. Toxicology is the study of the adverse effects of chemical agents on biological sys-
tems. See Louis J. CASARETr & JOHN DOULL, CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE
BASIC SCIENCE OFPOISONs 3 (Mary A. Amdur et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991).
6. See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
(1994). This manual offers suggestions for effective management of expert testimony and
contains separate chapters on epidemiology, toxicology, survey research, DNA evidence, sta-
tistics, multiple regressions and estimation of economic loss in damage awards.
7. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563, at 775
(J.H. Chadboum ed., 1985).
8. Quoted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 34 (1942).
9. See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952).
10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See, e.g., People v. Venegas, 18
Cal. 4th 47, 954 P.2d 525, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262 (1998).
11. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For the history
and an analysis of Daubert, see Richard Bjur & James T. Richardson, Expert Testimony In-
volving Chemists and Chemistry, in EXPERT WITNESSING, UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLAINING
SCIENCE 67-88 (Carl B. Meyer ed., 1999) [hereinafter EXPERT WrrNESSING].
12. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
13. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
14. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 126 F.3d 679, rev'd en banc, 151 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1997).
15. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (NCCUSL),
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 (1998).
[Vol. 35
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only be overturned when the trial judge acts capriciously. 6 The Federal Ju-
dicial Center has published a reference manual explaining the issues in
seven of the most contentious areas. 7
II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The current confusion starts with the definition of many legal and sci-
entific terms. The definition of the term "science" is broad."8 In the context
of expert witnessing, the term science includes physical scientists, social
scientists, engineers, physicians, other health care professionals, and even
lawyers." However, each of these fields subscribes to different goals and
uses different tools. Each requires not only much formal education, but
many years of practical experience."
The term "expert" means a person who has special skills or knowledge
in a field." This definition is articulated in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and in the corresponding definitions of the evidence laws of the
fifty states:
Fed. R. Evid. 702: Qualification as an Expert Witness
(a) A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as
an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. Against the objec-
tion of a party, such special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation must be shown before the witness may testify as an expert.
However, in practice, an expert must not only be a scientific expert, but
also an expert communicator and an expert persuader.'
Experts belong to a wide variety of professions and have widely diver-
gent education and skills. The practice of medicine, law, and engineering
requires a professional license and is subject to discipline by the respective
state agencies or boards. These professionals, while acting as experts, and
their expert testimony, are expected to conform to the standards of their pro-
fessions. 3 Chemistry and physics have highly standardized curricula and
16. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 1136 (1998).
17. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 6.
18. Science is knowledge attained through study or practice. WEBsTER's NEw
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (9th ed. 1991).
19. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 6, at 5.
20. See Carl Meyer, Science, Medicine and the U.S. Common Law Courts, in EXPERT
WITNEssING, supra note 11, at 6.
21. WEBSTER'S Nuw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1991).
22. See Kathey M. Verdeal, The Five Dimensions of Scientific Testimony, in EXPERT
WrrNESSING, supra note 11, at 121; Patricia M. Ayd & Merle M. Troeger, Presenting So-
phisticated Evidence Persuasively: The Role of the Scientific Expert and the Attorney at
Trial, in EXPERT WITNESSING, supra note 11, at 133.
23. In California, physicians, dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors, registered and voca-
tional nurses, psychiatric technicians, optometrists, pharmacists, and veterinary doctors are
regulated by their own boards, which have the power to adopt, amend, or repeal regulations
for regulating the practice of these professions. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 800 (1999).
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internationally recognized Ph.D. programs and degrees, but no licensing re-
quirement.
Some fields, such as toxicology, include different professions' that are
credentialed by separate private organizations.'
Second, in our technology oriented society,science has increasingly as-
sumed a role that is similar to the medieval church,26 in that its authority is
increasingly invoked by people who lack scientific training in areas that are
not scientific in nature.
Third, unlike lay witnesses, experts are allowed to express opinions,27
respond to hypothetical questions, and rely on evidence that would other-
wise not be admissible.28 Their testimony, in the form of opinion, can in-
clude opinions concerning the ultimate issues before the court.29 This gives
experts and their litigators a freedom and power that rivals that of the trier
of fact. As one trial judge expressed it:
This matter of opinion is a peculiar one, anyhow. First the expert witness
gets on the stand and gives his opinion that if such and such is the case,
then such and such must be the result, that is his opinion; then the lawyer
gives the jury the benefit of his opinion as to the opinion of the expert;
and then the jury is called upon to give their opinions of the opinions of
the lawyer and the expert, and it is only an opinion after all.3"
Fourth, since, by definition, experts possess knowledge that is not
shared by the jurors and judges, the veracity of their statements can only be
determined by indirect measures, such as their credentials, their demeanor,
and their ability to withstand criticism. A skilled, biased expert can under-
24. Toxicology involves the study of toxic substances and toxins on humans and the
laboratory animals used for testing on behalf of humans. The practitioners in this field engage
in a variety of activities that differ in education and methodology, and have very little, if any,
overlap. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 6, at 185. Clinical toxicologists are usually physicians
that treat the effect of poisoning, biological toxicologists tend to be biochemists with second
degrees in veterinary medicine engaging in animal and biological experiments, and forensic
toxicologist are mainly analytical chemists. Id.
25. By way of example, the American Board of Preventive Medicine, the American
Board of Pediatrics, and the American Boards of Emergency Medicine offer examinations
that certify members as diplomates in the subspecialty area of Medical Toxicology. See
American Board of Preventive Medicine (visited Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.abprevmed.
org/infobook.htm>. Candidates must have graduated from an accredited medical school in the
U.S., hold an active license as a physician, some postgraduate training and experience, and at
least two years of essentially full time training or practice in the speciality field. Id.
26. See Ann Lennarson Greer, The End of Splendid Isolation: Tensions Between Science
and Clinical Practice, in EXPERT WrINESING, supra note 11, at 51; Ann Lennarson Greer &
Carl Meyer, Explaining Science to Judges and Jurors, 75 THE CHEMIST 15-18 (Mar./Apr.
1998).
27. Opinion is a belief stronger than impression and less strong than positive knowledge.
See WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 1991).
28. See FED. R. EvID. 703.
29. See FED. R. EviD. 704.
30. J. Joel M. Longenecker, cited in A. L. MuNDO, THE EXPERT WrrNESS, xi (1938).
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mine the fairness of the legal process, unless the expert possesses a high de-
gree of personal integrity.
Fifth, criminal law, and an increasing part of our body of civil law, is
established by legislatures through political procedures. The price of free-
dom in our democracy is the coexistence of a variety of differing, and
sometimes incompatible, goals.
A dominant force for change of expert standards has nothing to do with
science, but is motivated by a shift in economic concerns." Thus, scientific
and professional trade organizations tend to encourage testimony that is fa-
vorable to the industries on whose funding they depend,32 but usually dis-
courage scientific testimony on behalf of consumers or environmental
groups. Also, during the past two decades, the public policy concerning
product liability and environmental issues has shifted due to economic and
political pressures. Defendants in product liability cases have claimed that
unbridled testimony by scientific experts and junk science have misguided
juries to come out with run-away verdicts that damage our economy.
Sixth, it is difficult to find evidence standards that are applicable to all
sciences because each science is at a different stage of sophistication; each
field uses different tools, operates on different assumptions, employs differ-
ent methodologies, and has different goals, resulting in large cultural and
language gaps.33
Seventh, our U.S. common law system is not conducive to comprehen-
sive scientific contemplation. The trier of fact is limited to the closed uni-
verse of testimony selected and presented by the parties, and the admissibil-
ity of evidence is controlled by elaborate statutory and common law rules
that allow the judge to shape issues by limiting testimony. Furthermore, ex-
pert testimony is traditionally oral; it is elicited in the form of direct exami-
nation, followed by cross examination' that focuses on credibility and bias
31. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 18
(1991).
32. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Philip H. Abelson, Toxic Ter-
ror: Phantom Risks, 261 SCI. 407 (1993); Philip H. Abelson, Pathological Growth of Regu-
lations, 260 ScI. 1859 (1993); Philip H. Abelson, Risk Assessment of Low Level Exposures,
265 SCI. 1507 (1994).
33. By way of example, clinical physicians are patient oriented; physicians at research
institutions pursue the long-term goal of curing specific diseases. The goal of the first is to
make new medication available to every patient; the goal of the second is to conduct large-
scale trials, including placebos, to determine the over-all efficacy of new medication.
34. A full cross-examination of a witness upon the subject of his examination in chief is
the absolute right, not the mere privilege of a party, and a denial of this right is a prejudicial
and fatal error. See Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1884). See generally Lindsey v.
United States, 133 F.2d 368, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1942), overruled on other grounds by 405 F.2d
1352, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1968); H. A. Hammelmann, Expert Evidence, 10 MOD. L. REv. 32, 34
(1947), cited in Paul Alan Lucey, Medical Malpractice Law in the USSR: A New Emphasis
on Civil Liability?, 1985 Wis. L. Rv. 989, 1001 (1985); Adolph Homburger, Functions of
Orality in Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 34 (1970); Brown
v. Colm, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 645 (1974) (stating that the test is whether the witness has skill or
experience sufficient so that testimony will aid the jury).
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of the expert. The testimony takes place in the dramatic forum of the court
room that includes armed bailiffs and a black-robed judge. 5
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, U.S. jurors are not yet allowed to
ask questions; in many, they are not even allowed to take notes. Thus, espe-
cially in long trials involving multiple issues and a large number of wit-
nesses, the trier of fact has insufficient ability to sift and organize contra-
dictory information because they must screen and prune down information
as the trial proceeds, long before the judge reads the jury instructions that
tell the jurors the criteria for selecting relevant issues. This discourages ju-
rors from analyzing facts and forming their own opinions, and encourages
them to select and accept the opinions presented by the most persuasive
witness. 6
In order to reduce undue influences of expert witnesses in our system,
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a new set of rules during the past six years.
In a nutshell, the Daubert decision allows the parties to ask for a pre-trial
hearing during which the trial judge may apply one or all of the four Dau-
bert criteria to determine whether testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
presented to the jury.3
Determining the reliability of expert testimony involves two separate
questions: Is the expert qualified to proffer an opinion; this is a question of
law. The second is whether the expert opinion is reliable; this is traditionally
a question of fact, and in the province of the jury, but Daubert, Joiner and
Kumho have shifted it into the province of the judge. Daubert established
four criteria for evaluating the reliability of scientific testimony: the falsifi-
ability of a theory, the known or potential error rate, whether the findings
have been subject to peer review, and the general acceptance. Kumho ex-
panded the use of these criteria to all testimony based on scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge, and established that one or more of
these criteria may, or may not need to be considered by the trial judge de-
pending on the nature of the issues, the expert's professional experience, or
the subject of the testimony.38
The Joiner decision further expanded the discretion of trial judges by
limiting appeals and encouraging judges to determine whether there is "too
35. See, e.g., David E. Asma, Courtroom Majesty and Defendant Frames: A Theater of
Powerlessness 12, 22 (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Northern Illinois University) (visited
Mar. 6, 1999) <http://sun.soci.niti.edu/theses/asma.txt>.
36. This differs from the civil law systems in Continental European countries, which
have a much smaller body of evidentiary rules. In these countries, the judge participates in
and supervises discovery. Expert testimony is provided long before trial in the form of writ-
ten reports, leaving ample time for obtaining written reviews by local, and sometimes world-
wide professional peers and for further responses that are available to the trier of facts for re-
view prior to trial. See, e.g., Z. P. 0. §§ 402-413, translated in CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURES OF
GERMANY (S.L. Gosen trans., 1990).
37. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (1993), modified in part, Kumho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
38. See Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
[Vol. 35
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large a gap" between the data underlying the opinion and the expert's opin-
ion itself?9 The fact that the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho decisions charge
the trial judges with the responsibility of evaluating the reliability of expert
testimony presupposes that the traditional adversary process is insufficient
to enable opposing counsel and their experts to ferret out inaccuracies and
bias in expert testimony.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
A. Lawyers and Scientists Tend to Underestimate the Barriers Blocking
Communications Between Them
Most litigators and trial judges readily admit that they lack a solid
foundation in science,' but they tend to underestimate the communication
problem that results from this cultural gap.' While no lawyer would believe
that he can intelligently discuss law with a person not schooled in law,
whether he has barely finished high school or is a brilliant Nobel prize win-
ner, a large number of attorneys and judges believe that they should be able
to litigate and adjudicate scientific issues using common sense, without pos-
sessing basic scientific tools.42 Unfortunately, common sense is not reliable.
By way of a simple example, when two common liquids, water and alcohol,
are combined, the resulting volume is not the arithmetic sum of the two, but
smaller.43
The fact that professional scientists are not immune to being bewildered
by common sense is demonstrated by the long detours that characterize the
development of modem sciences. The history of chemistry provides many
classical examples. The long reign of the phlogiston theory was based on the
correct observation that carbon and other fuels disappear during combus-
tion, and on the logical and rational conclusion that if the fuel disappeared,
so did the chemical matter. It took several centuries and the genius of La-
voisier to demonstrate that carbon did not lose weight, but that, on the con-
39. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
40. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Because substantive
review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously
unreliable, I continue to believe we will do more to improve administrative decision-making
by concentrating our efforts on strengthening administrative procedures."); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("I recognize that I do not
know enough about dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustment, and the like
to decide whether or not the government's approach to these matters was statistically valid.").
41. See Robert A. Bohrer, The Fundamental Differences Between Sciences and the Law,
in EXPERT WITNESSING, supra note 11, at 41.
42. One reason for the difficulty in overcoming the professional gaps is that academic
studies can provide only a fraction of the skills that are required to independently analyze
problems and successfully practice medicine and chemistry because professional experience
is as important in medicine, chemistry, and other sciences as it is in the practice of law.
43. Generally, a volume change takes place when two components are mixed to form a
solution. See J. PHILIP BROMLEY, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 252 (1984). Thus, the combination of
1000 cm3 water with 400 cm3 of alcohol yields a volume of 1364.85 cm3. Id.
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trary, carbon gained weight during the combustion by combining with oxy-
gen to form carbon dioxide."
The fact that the public and most of our politicians still do not compre-
hend the chemistry of combustion is shown by the fact that power compa-
nies and other energy users are taxed for the use of cooling water, but not
for the consumption of oxygen that they extract from the ambient air.
B. The Competence of Experts is Limited to Their Field
The time of universal scholarship is over. Most technical questions in-
volve more than one field. By way of example, the proof of causation may
involve five or more specialties. The plaintiff needs to prove: (a) the pres-
ence of a toxic source; (b) the emission rate of the toxic source; (c) the ex-
posure level; (d) the toxic exposure experienced by the plaintiff; (e) the
dose-response curve for the alleged toxic; and (f) the correlation between
exposure and the symptoms presented by the plaintiff. The first step in-
volves material sciences and chemistry; the second and third steps involve
occupational hygiene and analytical chemistry; the third requires construc-
tion of a human exposure profile; the fourth involves molecular toxicology;
and the last requires coordination between a clinical toxicologist and the
plaintiff's treating physician. Each of these specialties involves different
skills, and each specialist speaks a different language.
When, for economic or other reasons, a party uses experts to cover
subjects outside of his field, the expert expresses what amounts to lay opin-
ion. An example is provided by Moore,' whose expert, Dr. Jenkins, a highly
credentialed M.D. and pulmonary specialist certified by the American
Board of Internists, was unable to prove causation because he did not con-
sider the importance of the toxic exposure level and could not interpret
dose-response considerations, and, therefore, was unable to substantiate a
link between the toxic source and Moore's poisoning.
It is noteworthy that the Moore court correctly excluded Dr. Jenkins
testimony as "unscientific speculations offered by a genuine specialist,"'
but failed to recognize that the root of the problem was that the expert was
asked to express opinions outside of his own field. 7 Had the expert's quali-
fications been challenged, he would have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
702, eliminating the need for a Daubert hearing.
44. See, e.g., BEAT MEYER, SULFUR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 187 (1978).
45. 151 F.3dat277.
46. Id. at 278 (citing Rosen v. Ceiba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996)).
47. The curriculum for pulmonary specialists and Diplomats of the American Board of
Internists does not include industrial hygiene and molecular toxicology. In fact, a review of
the curriculum of American medical schools, state licensing standards for M.D.s, and the
specifications for certification as a diplomat in internal medicine shows that the sum total of
required toxicological education and training consists of a two or three day course in poison-
ing that is usually offered during the second or third year of medical school. Telephone Inter-
view with Dr. Sylvia Holoida, M.D. (Mar. 2, 1996).
320 [Vol. 35
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C. Law, Science, and Medicine Are in a Cultural Struggle
Law, science, and medicine are interdependent,48 but use different
methodologies,49 belong to different cultures,5" and have different goals. The
strength of science is to develop explanations that are universally valid, i.e.,
consistent with all prior established facts and theories. In contrast, the legal
proceeding is able to produce localized, content-specific epistemological
and normative understandings that are not subordinate to inappropriate uni-
versal claims and standards."'
Each field claims priority over some areas of our life. In matters of life
and death, medicine demands a high level of priority; when natural forces
are involved, natural laws take precedence over man-made law, but the lat-
ter determines the limits for the conduct of everybody, including physicians
and scientists. This makes conflict inevitable.
We lawyers tend to forget that while our law enjoys supremacy in daily
life and over daily activities, the validity of law is limited in time and space,
while the validity of scientific law is universal and eternal. The tension be-
tween the different priorities tends to surface in product liability and envi-
ronmental class actions, and sometimes results in distortion of issues and
priorities.
The breast implant cases offer a good example that the adversary proc-
ess is not good at solving multidisciplinary problems. First, physicians are
more concerned with healing diseases than with the causation of diseases;
the threshold for medical intervention is not the same as that required for
establishing liability of a defendant manufacturer. Second, the law favors
litigation against only one of the potentially responsible parties, the product
manufacturers; it does not reach over-enthusiastic cosmetic surgeons who
failed to adequately warn their patients of the discomfort and risk connected
with the implants. 2 Third, the litigants emphasize the damage to the im-
mune system and other health issues that are not yet fully understood and
poorly proven.53 Such questions are not suitable for adversary adjudication
48. See Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Stephen G. Breyer,
The Interdependence of Science and Law, Address at the 1998 American Association for the
Advancement of Science Annual Meeting and Science Innovation Exposition (Feb. 16, 1998)
(available in The American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science (visited Mar. 26, 1999)
<http://www.aaas.org/scope/Breyer.htm>).
49. See Bohrer, supra note 41, at 43.
50. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics,
11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 14 (1994).
51. See JASANOFF, supra note 4, at 222.
52. See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN DEPT. OF HEALTH: INDEPENDENT REvIEW GROUP TO CHIEF
MEDICAL OFFICER, REPORT ON SILICON GEL BREAST IMPLANTS (1998) (visited Mar. 26, 1999)
<http://www.silicone-review.gov.uk> [hereinafter REPORT ON SILICON GEL BREAST
IMPLANTS]. Several of the nine recommendations in this report deal with better patient educa-
tion. See id. For a copy of a typical warning label, see BREAST IMPLANTS, AN INFORMATIONAL
UPDATE (visited Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/ocalbreast-implantslbitac.html>.
53. See REPORT ON SILICON GEL BREAST IMPLANTS, supra note 52.
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by trial or by scientific panels selected by the court or by trade associa-
tions. 4 Fourth, the emphasis on the reliability of medical diagnosis belittles
other issues, such as whether the patient gave fully informed consent," and
fifth, the class action format does not always allow adequate distinction of
the disruption experienced by individuals.
Global solutions to the legal and medical questions are in intrinsic con-
flict with the goal of localized, content-specific solutions that are the pur-
pose and goal of our common law system. 6
D. The Reliability of Scientific Facts is not Limited to Facts That can be
Explained
In science, observations have a higher rank than explanations and ra-
tionalizations. The history of science demonstrates that scientific phenom-
ena are commonly confirmed and validated long before their cause and un-
derlying processes are certain.' That is why we need a patent system that
offers protection for scientific discoveries that are not consistent with prior
knowledge, i.e., "novel. ''8
The same is true in medicine. A large part of the knowledge of medical
practitioners consists of cultural and occupational experience that is indi-
vidual and does not exist in libraries. 9 This does not distract from the reli-
ability of this type of information.
E. Legal and Scientific Thinking are not Strictly Rational Processes
Any intellectual enterprise is bound by the limits of human abilities and
facilities. Many problems involve multiple parameters that can be best re-
solved by creative problem solving, a process that involves moving or
searching from a current state to a desired state.' This process requires in-
tuitive approximation rather than merely linear, logical thinking. Problem
solving is an art." For example, creative legal problem solving requires con-
54. See Betty A. Diamond et. al., Rule 706 National Science Panel Report, In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Product Liability Litigation (MDL 926) (Nov. 19, 1998).
55. See id.
56. For an overview of breast implant litigations, see The Federal Judicial Ctr. (visited
Apr. 16, 1999) <http:lwww.fjc.gov/BREIMLITI md1926.htm>.
57. Some of the most widely used processes for smelting metals and producing sulfuric
acid have been commercially used and documented for more than five hundred years, but the
scientific basis for their understanding started less than hundred years ago, and much of it
remains incomplete. See, e.g., MEYER, supra note 44, at 187.
58. An invention is novel if it differs from prior art when no single prior art describes all
of the invention's elements. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
59. See JOSEPH M. JACOBS, DOCTORS AND RULES, A SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONAL
VALUES 15 (1995).
60. See Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach,
34 CAL. W. L. REV., 375, 375-78 (1998).
61. See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving v. the Case Method: A Marvelous Ad-
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sideration of six facets: the underlying needs and interests of the parties, an
analysis of the values inherent in the process, available resources, creative
thinking, problem prevention, and reflection whether the proposed solution
is the best course of action and whom it affects. 2
The train of human thought is not persistently rational.63 Even the most
disciplined level of human thinking is fraught with slips and gaps, providing
the basis for cross-examination in litigation practice. John Locke's percep-
tion of human thought,64 starting with perception, and proceeding with re-
tention, discrimination, comparison, and culminating in composition of
ideas,' leaves plenty of room for distraction from strictly logical thinking.
In the modem scheme, problem solving involves four steps: preparation
(exploring of resources, preliminary screening), incubation (mulling over
possibilities without preconception and rational restrictions, i.e., what might
be called brain-storming), illumination (coalescence of reasoning, resources
fall into place, and the results become defined), and verification (the results
become polished).'
F. A Strictly Rational Approach is not Always the Best Approach to Solving
Problems
While legal decisions need to be reasonable and reasoned, the laws of
nature are not bound by similar restraints.
The best balance between art and science depends not only on the field,
but on the state of a field and its goals. While the health sciences and clini-
cal medicine share many goals, and while it is true that clinicians follow
scientific methods in determining the diagnosis and treatment of diseases,67
clinicians and health care scientists have great difficulty communicating
with each other because they subscribe to a different balance between sci-
ence and art. The clinician usually lacks time to experiment and sort out pa-
rameters; he cannot risk inflicting harm; he often needs to rely on subjective
venture in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 367
(1998).
62. See id. at 378.
63. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENIAMIN J. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 539-41 (6th ed. 1995).
64. Thought is a goal-directed flow of ideas, symbols and associations initiated by a
problem or task, and leading towards a reality-oriented conclusion. See KAPLAN & SADOCK,
supra note 63, at 539. When a logical sequence occurs, thinking is normal; parapraxis (un-
consciously motivated lapse from logic termed a Freudian slip) is considered a normal part of
thinking. See id. In a broad sense, activities called "thinking" are internally adaptive re-
sponses to intrinsic and extrinsic stimuli; not only do they express inner impulses, but they
also serve to generate environmentally effective, goal-seeking behavior. 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 650-56 (15th ed. 1994).
65. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Prometheus
Books 1994) (identifying five steps of mental operation).
66. See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 63, at 539.
67. A diagnosis is always established by a four step sequence of taking a history of the
patient, a physical exam, diagnostic tests, and then observing the patient's response.
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presentation by the patient; he must consider personal and individual fac-
tors; his priority is to heal or improve the condition of the patient and start
treatment in the face of uncertainty, even when the chance of success is far
below the 50% threshold that civil litigators are accustomed to consider.
The dean of a major U.S. medical school has stated that only 15% of the de-
cisions a doctor makes every day are based on evidence."8
Thus, while the intensive, thirty year old program of the NIH to train
Ph.D. physicians who are equally fluent in the world of health science and
clinical care has attracted many of the most brilliant students, the program
has not yet been able to diminish the gap.' The same need for balancing sci-
ence and art for solving problems exists in other fields.
Creative thinking always contains elements of wishful and autistic
thinking." Even in the most rigorous and quantitative fields, such as theo-
retical physics, scientific reasoning is not purely mathematical, but depends
upon simplification by creative use of approximations.
G. The Border Between Scientiflc and Experiential Evidence is Fluid
The definitions of scientific and experiential testimony are clear and the
borders are sharp:
The distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testi-
mony is a critical one. By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to ajury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aeronautical engineer might be a
helpful witness. Since flight principles have some universality, the expert
could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee. Conceivably,
even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified to tes-
tify, as long as he was familiar with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always
take off into the wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would
be an acceptable witness if a proper foundation were laid for his conclu-
sions. The foundation would not relate to his formal training, but to his
first-hand observations. In other words, the beekeeper does not know any
more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more
68. Robert Califf, Director of the Duke University Clinical Research Institute, (quoted in
Nancy Gibbs, A Week in the Life of a Hospital, TIME MAGAZINE 68 (Oct.12, 1998)).
69. See Elizabeth Bromley, Editor's Note, The Evolving Relationship Between the Phy-
sician and the Scientist in the 20th Century, 281 MS/JAMA 94 (1999).
70. "Autistic thinking" arises from intrinsic influence, responsive to emotional and mo-
tivational impulses, including free associations, fantasy, dreaming and pathological thinking.
See 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 64, at 655. It arises from wishes and needs,
and represents activity through which individual symbolical gains and gratification can be
achieved that the environment does not provide. See id. Kaplan defines it as a preoccupation
with an inner, private world, somewhat similar to dereism. See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra
note 63, at 539. Dereism is a mental activity not concordant with logic or reality. See id. at
527.
For a more detailed explanation of the different forms of thinking that cooperate in the solu-
tion of medical problems, see EUGEN BLEULER, DAs AUTISTISCH -UNDISZIPLINIERTE DENKEN
IN DER MEDIZIN UND SEINE OBERWINDUNG (5th ed. 1962).
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bumblebees than they have.'
However, all scientific reasoning starts with an observation. That's why
scientists are primarily experiential witnesses, and why rational explana-
tions are secondary to experience. What separates the successful scientist
from the lay person are two things: first, good scientists have an extensive
base of knowledge, 2 a large set of tools to evaluate their observations, and
the scientist is more disciplined and systematic in the choice of his line of
reasoning; and second, good scientists have extensive practice in solving
problems, acquired by tackling complex, real-life problems, followed later,
whether successful or not, by careful post-mortem analysis of their proce-
dures.
A good problem solver relies first on as many objective criteria as pos-
sible, preferentially, criteria established by consensus (scientific laws or en-
gineering standards) and use of patterns of associations (such as semiology
in clinical analysis, or chemometrics in analytical chemistry) to organize
data and narrow the possible solutions.
Furthermore, the various sciences are at varying degrees of perfection
and few have achieved a completely rational level. Traditionally, scientific
reasoning is thought of as consisting of a reiterative process including five
steps: observation, tentative description, hypothesis and prediction, testing
of the hypothesis, and modification of the result by repetition of all ele-
ments.
In fact, insistence on a fully rational explanation of scientific facts and
phenomena encourages circular reasoning and pseudo-explanations;
Pseudo-science starts with the results, usually derived from solutions to
critical social or political problems.73 Pseudo- and junk science can also find
their way into expert opinions if the expert succumbs to wishful thinking or
undisciplined thinking as a short-cut to find pat answers to complex prob-
lems.74
H. Are Judges Better Qualified to Conduct an Independent and Objective
Validation of the Expert's Testimony Than Opposing Experts?
Traditionally, the responsibility for exposing flaws in expert testimony
71. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994).
72. The knowledge base includes knowledge derived from formal structured learning in
a structured curriculum, including textbook based and literature based learning, learning from
peers and mentors in smaller groups, and individual experience that is unique to the individ-
ual practitioner and is usually not recorded in written form. See BLEULER, supra note 70, at
127-39.
73. Pseudo-science is usually used to provide an imaginary solution to a pressing social
or healthcare problem. Practitioners need to be skilled in the art of persuasion in order to re-
tard and prevent the normal error correction and peer review procedures. See JEFFREY M.
BLUM, PSEUDOSClENCE AND MENTAL ABILrrY 154-60 (1978).
74. See, e.g., BLEULER, supra note 70, at 127-39. See generally BLUM, supra note 73
(analyzing the pseudo-scientific aspects of the long-popular IQ test).
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rests with the expert of the opposing party. Daubert shifts a large part of the
responsibility to the court."
However, the time when a college degree assured scientific competence
is long over. Most judges lack the basic training and experience that is nec-
essary for evaluating scientific opinions, and their individual level of scien-
tific competence varies. This causes serious problems because the key to a
successful legal system is that it provides a uniform application of rules of
law so that the outcome is predictable. In order to assure this, judges and
lawyers undergo extensive and standardized legal training. However, legal
licensing requirements and judicial qualifications do not test the applicant's
ability to understand scientific problems and require no minimum standard"
of scientific literacy." Therefore, judges must rely on their individual
knowledge derived from short courses, from opinions expressed by neutral
experts, or from more or less remote memories of public school science
courses,78 and their comprehension and handling of scientific issues is in-
trinsically not predictable.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Many different solutions have been proposed in the past. The most
common, without reservations, are:
A. Change Procedural Rules to Assist Jurors With Rational Decisionmaking
The reliability of expert testimony is not the only barrier towards find-
ing justice. If our goal is to increase the reliability of the outcome of trials,
one needs to consider the entire process.
75. But see Moore, 151 F.3d at 276 ("The party seeking to have the district court admit
expert testimony must demonstrate that the expert's findings and conclusions are based on
the scientific method and therefore reliable. This requires some objective, independent vali-
dation of the expert methodology. The expert's assurances that he has utilized generally ac-
cepted scientific methodology is insufficient.").
76. The level of literacy required to evaluate scientific opinions differs, depending on
the field, and other factors.
77. "Literacy" means an individual's ability to read, write, and speak in English, and
compute and solve problems at levels of proficiency necessary to function on the job and in
society, to achieve one's goals and develop one's knowledge and potential. See National Lit-
eracy Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-73, § 3. "Scientific literacy" standards have evolved from
work by several groups and committees sponsored by the American Association For The Ad-
vancement Of Science. See, e.g., Benchmarks for Science Literacy and Project 2061; in
SCIENCE FOR ALL AMERICANS (1993).
78. Scientific literacy, defined in U.S. High School graduation requirements, includes
familiarity with some basic mathematical skills that are traditionally acquired between grades
7 and 10 in junior high and high school courses, such as the ability to solve story problems,
fundamentals of algebra, differential calculus and statistics. These courses are still required of
all students who seek admission to European universities, but U.S. high school standards are
currently substantially lower than one hundred years ago, and admission tests require only
minimal mathematical skill. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Whether an expert is qualified to express an opinion is a question of
law; whether his testimony is reliable is a question of fact. The first is in the
province of the judge, the second in that of the jury. There is no hard em-
pirical evidence supporting the argument that a lay jury cannot critically
evaluate scientific evidence. 9 By charging the judge with determining the
reliability of expert testimony, Daubert and Joiner shift the responsibility
between the two on the theory that the evidence rules give experts excessive
authority and make jurors excessively vulnerable to pseudo-scientific testi-
mony. However, it seems proper to ask whether this problem could not be
resolved without disturbing the balance between law and fact.
One cannot solve mathematical or scientific problems before the prob-
lem is clearly stated and the parameters are defined. Traditionally, in jury
trials, the jurors hear the evidence without a compass to find their way. Ari-
zona has been a pioneer in implementing procedures that help jurors com-
prehend issues. Since December 1, 1995, the parties may read pleadings to
jurors," jurors are permitted to submit written questions directed to wit-
nesses and the judge,8' and jurors may take notes in civil 2 as well as crimi-
nal cases.83 Jurors are allowed to discuss evidence" and review notes during
recesses and during deliberations.' In complex cases, jurors may be pro-
vided notebooks that include jury instructions, key documents, witness
names and pictures, and a glossary of legal terms. B. Michael Dann, a Mari-
copa County Superior Court judge in Phoenix who was the chair and
"spiritual leader" of the jury reform committee, also favors the practice of
jurors asking questions. In his initial instructions, he explains to the jury that
their questions must meet the same standards the attorneys follow. The Su-
preme Court currently is considering two additional rules changes: one
would extend juror discussions during trial to criminal cases. The second
would allow a trial judge to require counsel to summarize depositions and
agree upon a written summary rather than reading the contents in the tradi-
tional question and answer format. The Arizona experiment is being evalu-
ated by the National Center of State Courts.86
B. Use a Legal Standard to Evaluate Scientific Evidence
In its recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court gives federal trial
79. See Emanuel Imwinkelreid, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Cri-
tique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 100 MiL. L. REv. 99, 114-16 (1983).
80. See ARIz. R. CIV. P. 39(b) (1997).
81. See id. 39(b)(10); see also ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6, 18.6(c), 18.6(d) (1997).
82. See ARIz. R. Civ. P. 39(b), 39(b)(10) (1997) and comments.
83. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6 (1997).
84. See ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(f) (1997) and comments.
85. See id. 22.2.
86. See Tom Munsterman & Paula Hannaford, Innovations in Jury Trial Procedures, A
Manual on Innovations in Jury Trial Procedures (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.
ncsc.dni.us/research/projects/admin.htm>.
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judges increasing discretion to determine the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence on the basis of rather broad and vague concepts." The Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence prepared by the Federal Judicial Center has
tried to help by providing scientific guidelines for trial judges." Trial judges
have also been the beneficiaries of informal short courses offered by public
and special interest groups.89 The main problem with these approaches is
that judges are encouraged to apply an individual and undefined standard.
C. Use Neutral Experts
Another widely promoted proposal is for judges to use FRE 706 and
select their own, "neutral" experts. This approach will eliminate the diver-
sity of scientific opinions, but hearing only one side does not make testi-
mony more reliable." Furthermore, judges have difficulties finding compe-
tent experts. 9'
D. Delegate Scientific Issues to Panels of Scientists or Professional
Societies
There have been periodic efforts to delegate the resolution of scientific
questions to scientists, either by appointment of committees or to some form
of science court. These efforts have failed because the scientific problem-
solving methodology favors professional competence and authority rather
than due process, and professional and trade organizations are mired by con-
flicts of interest that favor politics over scientific facts. The use of scientific
panels introduces other difficulties; specialists lack experience in interdisci-
plinary communications. They constitute an extra-legal tribunal, using ex-
tra-legal procedures, substituting professional ethics92 for legal stan-
dards,93and their proceedings are insufficiently open and public.9"
87. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-596; Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 512; Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at
1167.
88. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 6.
89. Among the sponsors of short courses for federal and state judges have been the Na-
tional Research Council, the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences, and
organizations sponsored by special interest groups, such as the Heritage Foundation and the
Einstein Institute for Science, Health and the Courts.
90. See generally Carl Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert: A
View from the Trenches, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 36 (1997).
91. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 6 at 524. See generally Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the FRE, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 480 (1988).
92. Professional ethics in that it is "a scheme of law enforcement.., by private police-
men where privately declared laws are punished by penalties imposed by private 'judges' af-
ter privately conducted trials." 128 TRADE REG. Rpm. (FTC) 9117950 at 20329 (1967).
93. This problem is discussed in Fashion Originator's Guild v. Federal Trade Commn,
312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
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In Joiner, the U.S. Supreme Court recommends that judges use profes-
sional societies as intermediaries or sponsors for neutral experts or expert
panels.95 However, even the most widely respected professional organiza-
tions have conflicting priorities and agendas. By way of example, the
American Dental Association offers continued dental education, it resolves
patient-dentist conflicts by sponsoring peer review panels, and it enforces its
code of professional ethics, including limits on advertising that the Federal
Trade Commission has described as a continuing conspiracy to fix the price
of dental services.96 The history of the century old battle over the safety of
dental amalgam' further illuminates the irrational decisions that result when
an organization has conflicting goals.98
By way of a second example, the world's largest professional society,
the American Chemical Society, not only publishes more than a dozen of
the world's most prestigious technical journals and organizes biannual tech-
nical meetings that serve as an international forum for catalyzing progress in
all fields of academic and applied chemistry, but, less visible to its academic
members, it also takes an active role in protecting and defending the chemi-
cal industry against public criticism and litigation.99
Finally, in the large number of cases where the knowledge resides
within the defendant industry, the panel either lacks competence or consists
of employees of, consultants to, or trade associations representing, the de-
fendants.
E. The Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 702
Perhaps the most promising proposal, has originated with the National
Council on Uniform State Laws which submitted to the federal judicial
counsel a proposed draft of a revised FRE 702 which provides:
(REVISED) RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a witness
94. The requirement of open proceedings is not only necessary for legal, but also for sci-
entific reasons. See Arthur Kantrowitz, Elitism vs. Checks and Balances in Communicating:
Scientific Information to the Public, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 101-11 (1993).
95. See Justice Breyer, supra note 48.
96. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.
1997) (enforcing cease and desist order on price advertising).
97. See generally ROBERT W. MCCLUGGAGE, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN DENTAL
ASSOCIATION: A CENTURY OF HEALTH SERVIcE 67 (1959).
98. See Michael A. Royal, Amalgam Fillings: Do Dental Patients Have a Right to In-
formed Consent?-Risks Suggested by (Admittedly Controversial) Studies of Amalgam Fill-
ings Warrant Permitting Patients to Choose Alternatives, 2 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH &
SAFETY 141 (1991).
99. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Chemical Society, Bush Ranch, Inc.
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 918 F.Supp. 1524 (M.D.Ga. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 363
(11 th Cir. 1996). See generally CHEM. & ENG. NmWs, Dec. 18, 1995 (criticizing a federal trial
judge, and arguing that expert witnesses for the chemical industry should not be compelled to
disclose the results of all laboratory experiments that they conduct).
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qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.(a) General rule. A witness may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise
if the following are satisfied.
(1) Basis for testimony. The testimony is based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.(2) Assistance to trier of fact. The testimony will assist the trier of fact to
understand evidence or determine a fact at issue.(3) Qualification of witness. The witness is qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education as an expert in the scientific, technical,
or other specialized field.
(4) Reasonable reliability. The testimony is based upon principles or
methodology which is reasonably reliable as established under subdivision(b), (c), or (e).(5) Reliably applied to facts of case. The witness has applied the princi-
ples or methodology reliably to the facts of the case.
(b) Reliability deemed to exist. A principle or methodology is deemed
reasonably reliable if its reliability has been established by controlling
legislation or judicial decision.(c) Presumption of reliability. A principle or methodology is presumed to
be reasonably reliable if it has substantial acceptance within the relevant
scientific, technical, or specialized community. A party may rebut the pre-
sumption by proving that it is more probable than not that the principle or
methodology is not reasonably reliable as provided in subdivision (e).
(d) Presumption of unreliability. A principle or methodology is presumed
not to be reasonably reliable if it does not have substantial acceptance
within the relevant scientific, technical, or specialized community. A party
may rebut the presumption if it is more probable than not that the princi-
ple or methodology is reasonably reliable as provided in subdivision (e).(e) Other reliability factors. When determining the reliability of a princi-
ple or methodology, the court shall consider all relevant additional factors,
which may include:
(1) Testing. The extent to which the principle or methodology has been
tested;(2) Research methods. The adequacy of research methods employed in
testing the principle or methodology;
(3) Peer review. The extent to which the principle or methodology has
been published and subjected to peer review;
(4) Rate of error. The rate of error in the application of the principle or
methodology;(5) Experience of expert. The experience of the witness as an expert in the
application of the principle or methodology; and
(6) Acceptance within the field. The extent to which the field of knowl-
edge has substantial acceotance within the relevant scientific, technical, or
specialized community. gs
It remains to be seen how much of this revision after a revised version
is prepared by the Federal Judicial Council, will change.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our arguments can be summarized as follows:
100. Proposed FED. R. EviD. 702, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.
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It is intrinsically difficult for litigators and the courts to determine the
reliability of scientific, technical, and other specialized testimony. During
the past seven years, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a new set of
rules to allow scientifically untrained lawyers and judges to determine
whether certain types of scientific testimony is reliable and to exclude "sci-
entifically unreliable" testimony before it is heard by jurors. This effort has
had mixed success because it is difficult for scientifically untrained lawyers
and judges to distinguish between scientific reasoning and pseudo-scientific
rationalizations.
While Kumho has clarified that the Daubert rules apply not only to sci-
entific but to all technical and other specialized knowledge, it has com-
pounded problems for litigants by giving trial judges broad discretion to
determine in each case which of the Daubert criteria they wish to apply. The
lack of an objective standard, combined with the lack of a minimum stan-
dard for the scientific proficiency of litigators and judges, defies a basic
goal of the law, namely to make the outcome of a Daubert hearing predict-
able.
In our diverse society, there always will be disagreement on how dis-
putes should be resolved and what type of evidence should be admitted in
our courts. Critics of our court system often overestimate the importance of
science relative to social and public policy concerns. They tend to forget
that local laws, even criminal laws, differ, and that the goal of the court is to
find solutions that match local needs. Furthermore, the availability and reli-
ability of evidence differs for each element that is necessary to prove or de-
fend a case. The standard of admissibility of scientific evidence might need
to be adjusted to conform to the needs of an individual case.
Scientific evidence is often unreliable not because the science lacks re-
liability, but because it is misstated, or its reliability is misstated, or because
the expert's expertise is misstated. For instance, treating physicians are
rarely challenged when they expound toxicological opinions, even though
toxicology is not taught in medical school and most clinical physicians have
no toxicological knowledge or experience.
Neutral experts do not solve the problem of scientific illiteracy of
judges and attorneys, but they do reduce the dialogue that helps the trier of
fact balance the interests of the parties.
The litigating attorneys have more time and are in a better position to
evaluate expert qualifications and expert opinions. Much of the need for the
complex Daubert rules and their time consuming implementation could be
avoided if litigators possessed sufficient scientific understanding and skill to
analyze the competence of experts and the reliability of their testimony.
The emotionally charged atmosphere of the U.S. common law court is
not conducive to resolving scientific issues.'' The Arizona experiment,
which allows jurors to ask questions and take notes, greatly improves the
comprehension of scientific issues.
101. See Munsterman & Hannaford, supra note 86.
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Large, nationwide class actions litigations, such as asbestos litigations
or breast implant litigations, reveal the intrinsic conflict between the goal of
science to produce universally valid solutions and the goal of the courts to
produce quick and final local solutions to disputes.
Since jurors and judges are limited to the closed universe of evidence
presented by the parties, and expert testimony is filtered by lawyers who do
not understand the underlying science, the quality and reliability of scien-
tific opinions could be greatly improved if expert reports were exchanged
earlier, if the response of third-party professional peers could be solicited,
and if both would be available to the judge and jurors without editing or fil-
tering by counsel." z
If the purpose of the Daubert rule is to implement a more restrictive
public policy of compensation in product liability cases, it would be easier
and more candid to use the well established concept of "proximate causa-
tion," rather then esoteric evidence rules, to limit recovery.
102. This proposal is similar to the procedures used in regulatory proceedings and in
civil litigation in the Civil courts of continental Europe.
103. "What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." Palsgraf v. Long Is-
land R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (1928).
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